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Abstract. EU Directive 95/46/EC and the upcoming EU General Data
Protection Regulation grant Europeans the right of access to data per-
taining to them. Consumers can approach their service providers to ob-
tain all personal data stored and processed there. Furthermore, they can
demand erasure (or correction) of their data. We conducted an under-
cover field study to determine whether these rights can be exerted in
practice. We assessed the behaviour of the vendors of 150 smartphone
apps and 120 websites that are popular in Germany. Our deletion re-
quests were fulfilled in 52 to 57 % of the cases and less than half of
the data provision requests were answered satisfactorily. Further, we ob-
served instances of carelessness: About 20 % of website owners would
have disclosed our personal data to impostors. The results indicate that
exerting privacy rights that have been introduced two decades ago is still
a frustrating endeavour most of the time.
Keywords: Germany, Selbstauskunft, disclosure, deletion, empirical, websites,
apps, GDPR
1 Introduction
Consumers are losing control of their personal data due to its pervasive collection
in online services and apps. Answering the simple question “Who knows what
about me?”, which is at the core of informational self-determination, has become
a complex and involving task. However, users are interested in answers. For
instance, Lightbeam (previously called Collusion), which visualizes cookie-based
tracking efforts, has been downloaded more than 600,000 times [9]. In a recent
survey, more than 90 % of respondents stated that it was important for them (a)
to be in control about who gets information about them and (b) to control what
information is collected [11]. Researchers have proposed privacy agents for this
purpose, client-side tools that keep track of the data entered into form fields [6].
However, privacy agents have not seen widespread adoption so far.
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EU Directive 95/46/EC [5] and the upcoming General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (GDPR) grant citizens the right to obtain all data relating to them from
data controllers. Citizens can also demand rectification, erasure or blocking of
their data. In Germany, these provisions have been implemented in the Federal
Data Protection Act in 2009 (cf. http://gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch bdsg/).
They are mostly exercised for scoring (e. g. the German “Schufa”) and marketing
services (e. g. Arvato) at the moment. In principle, consumers can also exercise
them for all online service providers, but their effectiveness is unknown so far.
Will ordinary online shops bother to dig into their database when asked via
e-mail by a customer?
Until now there was only circumstantial evidence suggesting that many data
controllers are reluctant to answer data provision enquiries and that they fail
to carry out deletion requests. Moreover, we wanted to evaluate whether data
controllers handled personal data with due diligence. Therefore, we conducted
two studies analysing the behaviour of vendors of services that are popular in
Germany, comprising 150 smartphone apps and 120 websites. Both datasets have
been compiled in the months of August and September of 2014.
This paper is structured as follows. First, we review related work in Sect. 2.
In Sect. 3 we describe our methodology and present the results obtained for
smartphone app vendors. Results of our experiments with website owners follow
in Sect. 4. We discuss the results in Sect. 5, before we conclude the paper in
Sect. 6.
2 Related work
We are not aware of previous research studying the behaviour of online service
providers to determine the effectiveness of the right of access to personal data in
practice. Balebako et al. [1] analysed the privacy attitudes and the behaviour of
app developers. However, in contrast to our undercover study, they conducted
interviews and used an online survey. Most research about online privacy focuses
on software, e. g. app permissions as well as what kind of data is being collected
by apps and whom it is shared with. Another line studies legal and usability
aspects, for instance by analysing privacy policies. In the following we will review
recent work along these lines.
Zang et al. [17] monitored HTTP(S) transmissions of popular apps and found
that many apps share information with third-party websites. TaintDroid is an
effort to detect privacy violations by means of taint analysis [4]. The second
GPEN Privacy Sweep [10] conducted by privacy enforcement authorities found
that the majority of apps does not provide sufficient information for the user
to understand why it is necessary to grant the requested permissions, which
were found to be excessive in relation to the functionality for 31 % of the apps.
Other studies are concerned with the willingness of smartphone users to grant
apps certain permissions and/or their willingness to share personal information
with third parties [7,8]. ICSI Haystack (https://www.haystack.mobi) alerts users
about data leaks and collects data for research on privacy in mobile ecosystems.
Sunyaev et al. [14] studied the 600 most popular mobile health apps and
found that only about 30 % did have a privacy policy, out of which about two
thirds “did not specifically address the app itself”. They also deem these policies
to be hard to read. Balebako et al. [2] studied how well users will take notice
of the privacy policy of an app depending on when it is being displayed. They
found displaying the notice within the app to be more effective than displaying
it in the app store. Schaub et al. [13] analyse how privacy notices should be
designed to be most effective, i. e. be noticed by users. Vila et al. [16] state that
users do not pay attention to privacy policies, as they are not a reliable indicator
for whether the user’s privacy will actually be respected by a website. A similar
observation has been made by Chia et al. [3] for mobile apps: they found no
reliable indicator for whether an app would actually respect a user’s privacy.
Pollach [12] also deems privacy policies to be ineffective in addressing user’s
privacy concerns due to them mostly being designed “with the threat of privacy
litigations in mind”. Through a linguistic analysis, she found that questionable
uses of data are often downplayed in policies. Despite users currently not paying
attention to privacy policies, there is evidence that making the level of privacy
easily visible to potential customers (e. g. by presenting it in a table) can influence
their purchase decision, with them being willing to pay a premium for privacy
[15].
So far, there is only little work in practice. The browser add-on ToS;DR
(https://tosdr.org) enables users to better understand privacy policies. For se-
lected sites, it displays a summarised version of the terms of service at the click
of a button and provides a colour-coded rating. The website selbstauskunft.net
offers to send personal data enquiries to companies and authorities for German
consumers, requiring virtually no effort. On justdelete.me, consumers can find
information on how to delete accounts with many online services.
3 First study: popular smartphone apps
3.1 Data collection
For the selection of popular apps we relied on AppAnnie (http://www.appannie.
com/), a market research company that monitors the downloads of apps from
Apple’s and Google’s stores. We downloaded AppAnnie’s list of the 500 most
popular apps (in terms of downloads in Germany). From this list we took the
25 most popular free as well as the 25 most popular paid apps each for Android
and iOS (100 apps in total). In addition, we randomly selected 25 free apps per
platform from apps ranked between 50 and 500 in order to extend the scope of
the survey. If a specific app was available for both platforms, precedence was
given to the Android version. The selected apps are listed in Appendix 1.
In the following we characterize the dataset (see Fig. 5 in the appendix).
Entertainment apps and games dominate the dataset with a share of 46 % of all
apps, followed by apps that are used for work and information exchange (39 %).
The smallest groups are apps used for communication and shopping (8 % and
7 %, respectively). Most app vendors are located in Germany (38 %). Vendors
from other European countries are responsible for 21 % of the apps in the dataset,
while 36 % are from other parts of the world (mainly the US). For 5 % of the
apps, it was not possible to determine the vendor’s residence. While it is beyond
the scope of this paper to profoundly assess the legal situation, we note that
Section 1 of the German Federal Data Protection Act states that it is applicable
to vendors from non-EU countries under certain circumstances. While it may be
difficult to exercise privacy rights against vendors in foreign countries, we still
include those vendors in our study in order to compare their behaviour with that
of domestic vendors.
We also tried to roughly categorize the vendors in terms of their size based
on publicly available information, such as the number of employees. We found
that 41 % of vendors are small, i. e. they consist of a single developer only, about
a third are businesses with multiple developers, and 25 % are large enterprises.
3.2 Methodology for interaction with app vendors
The first objective of the study is to assess how app vendors react when users
contact them to request (a) provision of their personal data and (b) deletion
of their personal data. In order to obtain realistic results, we did not want to
disclose to them that we were conducting a study about their behaviour. Instead,
we approached the vendors like ordinary consumers. The second objective is to
validate the claims received by the vendors.
We downloaded each app from the app store onto a smartphone and used
it for a couple of minutes. When an app allowed to create an account or asked
to provide personal data, we entered as many details as possible. We made
the following arrangements to avoid arousing suspicion. For each app, we set
up a fake profile having a randomly chosen German name and a random birth
date. When asked to choose login credentials, we derived the username from
the name and year of birth, while the password was chosen randomly. For the
postal address, we used that of the Computer Science Department of University
of Hamburg, which provides a satisfactory cover because it also hosts a number
of other companies. We instructed the campus post office to accept mail for
our fake identities, even though it was not addressed to the Computer Science
Department. Moreover, we registered the domain barmail.de and used e-mail
addresses of the form firstname.lastname@barmail.de.
We made a note of what data we entered in each app. Furthermore, we
monitored the traffic of all apps to determine what pieces of data were disclosed
to the vendors. For this purpose, we ensured that the apps were used while
the smartphone was on a WiFi connection. We installed a custom CA root
certificate on the phone to record all HTTP(S) traffic with BurpSuite (http:
//portswigger.net/burp). When we were analysing the responses of the vendors
at a later stage, the recorded traffic allowed us to validate the claims of the
vendors regarding what pieces of information they have or have not received
about our account and whether or not their apps were transferring sensitive
pieces of data (e. g. IMSI/IMEI) to other parties.
One week later, we approached each vendor via e-mail. This first data pro-
vision enquiry consisted of an informal e-mail in German or English (depending
on the language of the app). The mail was sent from the address used during
account setup. If no account was set up in the app, the mail was sent from the
e-mail address used to log in to the Apple iTunes or Google Play store. We sent
the e-mail to the address stated on the app page within the respective store.
If no address was stated there, we looked up a contact address on the vendor’s
website or submitted our enquiry via a web form provided there. In the enquiry
we stated the respective e-mail address and username and asked the vendor to
provide all personal data that was stored on its servers and the purpose of their
collection.
If there was no response within one week or if it was not satisfactory (cf.
Sect. 3.3), we sent a second data provision enquiry. The second enquiry
was written more formally than the first one, because we hypothesized that a
more formal and threatening tone would illicit more responses. Therefore, the
enquiry contained an explicit reference to Section 34 of the German Federal Data
Protection Act and in closing we announced that we would notify the supervisory
authority according to Section 38 of the aforementioned act (which we did not
in fact do) if we did not receive a response within seven days.
Four weeks after the last contact, we continued with the analysis of ac-
count deletion practices. This analysis was limited to those 56 apps allowing
to set up an account. First, we tried to delete the account from within each
app and on the vendor’s website on our own. Otherwise we sent a first dele-
tion request to the vendor from the e-mail address used during registration,
in which we informally asked to have our account deleted. If we did not re-
ceive a response within one week or if we determined that the account was not
deleted completely, we followed up with a formal second deletion request,
referring to Section 35 of the Data Protection Act. Again, we announced that
we would notify the supervisory authority unless we received a response within
seven days. Obviously, it is impossible for consumers to verify that all of their
personal data has been deleted completely by a vendor. Therefore, we can only
look for signs that indicate an incomplete deletion. We verified claims about
the purported deletion of an account as follows: First, we tried to log in with
the previously used credentials, which should not be possible any more. Second,
we tried to reset the password, which, if successful, indicates that the account
had been disabled rather than deleted. Third, we tried to create a new account
with the same credentials. This should succeed. Otherwise, the vendor keeps
some records about “deleted” accounts (which may in fact be compliant with
the data protection act).
3.3 Analysis and results for apps
The results for the data provision enquiry are summarised in Fig. 1. The upper
part shows the overall distribution of responses. A satisfactory (OK) response
was scored if the response contained the actual data values that we had observed
being transferred from the app to the vendor, or, in case we did not observe the
After first enquiry
After second enquiry
OK (0.22) incomplete (0.29) 0.04 no response (0.45)
OK (0.43) incomplete 0.04 no response (0.39)
unreachable denied
0.12 0.02
Overall evaluation of all apps (150)
Fraction of “OK” responses after first and second enquiry
free 1000.20  0.40
paid 500.26  0.48
Cost of app
Germany 570.44  0.74
Rest of EU 320.09  0.25
Rest of world 540.07  0.24
Vendor’s country of residence
Android 750.15  0.33
iOS 750.29  0.52
Operating system
Information 280.43  0.71
Shopping 110.00  0.45
Productivity 300.17  0.43
Main functionality
Communication 120.33  0.42
Entertainment 690.17  0.30
large 370.30  0.49
medium 520.19  0.44
small 610.20  0.38
Size of vendor’s business
size of sub-sample
Fig. 1. Results for data provision enquiry for popular apps
app transmitting anything to the vendor at all, if the response stated this fact.
The first enquiry was answered satisfactorily by only 22 % of vendors, increasing
to 43 % after the more formal second enquiry. Two of the vendors responded by
postal mail, all others via e-mail. Some vendors only stated what kinds of infor-
mation they typically store in an abstract fashion, i. e. they had not looked up
our entry in their records at all. Others referred us to their privacy policy. Those
cases were recorded as incomplete responses, because they did not provide our
personal data as requested. The fraction of incomplete responses decreased from
29 % (first enquiry) to 12 % (second enquiry). This indicates that customers have
to be insisting to obtain the desired information. For 4 % of the apps, we found
no way to contact the vendor or our e-mail bounced (unreachable). Many
vendors did not reply to our mails (45 and 39 %, respectively). In response to
the second enquiry, 2 % of vendors explicitly denied to answer our enquiry by
e-mail, instructing us to call them or to send our enquiry by postal mail.
The bottom part of Fig. 1 focuses on the “OK” cases. The highest fraction
of satisfactory responses is achieved by German vendors (44 % and 74 %, respec-
tively). One reason for this discrepancy may be that vendors from Germany are
more sensitive to privacy than vendors from other countries. A reason for their
poor performance after the second enquiry may be that foreign vendors do not
fear the consequences of customers notifying the German supervisory authori-
ties, which cannot exert power in foreign jurisdictions. Vendors of apps that are
mainly used for providing or exchanging information scored better (71 %) than
those of other apps (e. g. games and entertainment apps: 30 %). Further, vendors
of iOS apps provided more satisfactory responses than those of Android apps (52
After first deletion request
After second deletion request
failed
Overall evaluation of all apps that allowed to create a user account (56)
Fraction of “deleted completely” cases after first and second request
Germany 240.75  0.83
Rest of EU 170.35  0.35
Rest of world 150.40  0.40
Vendor’s country of residence
Information 90.78  0.89
Shopping 100.60  0.60
Productivity 100.50  0.60
Main functionality
Communication 110.36  0.36
Entertainment 160.50  0.50
large 230.61  0.61
medium 230.43  0.52
small 100.60  0.60
Size of vendor’s business
deleted completely (0.54) 0.09 0.11 no reaction (0.27)
deleted completely (0.57) 0.09 0.11 no reaction (0.23)
impossible
Android 290.34  0.38
iOS 270.74  0.78
Operating system Cost of app
no analysis because dataset con- 
tains only 6 (out of 56) paid apps
size of sub-sample
Fig. 2. Results for deletion request for popular apps
vs. 31 %, respectively). Vendors of paid apps scored only marginally better than
those of free apps (48 vs. 40 %). Finally, large businesses scored best (49 %).
Figure 2 presents the results obtained for our deletion requests sent to the
vendors of the subset of 56 apps in which we had created a user profile that
was stored on the vendor’s servers. We could delete 13 accounts on our own, ei-
ther from within the app or on the vendor’s website. Overall, deletion succeeded
considerably more often than obtaining personal data. After the first informal
request, 20 accounts were completely deleted. Out of the 13 accounts men-
tioned above, 10 were completely deleted, resulting in a total of 54 % of accounts
(compared to 22 % satisfactory responses after the first data provision enquiry).
The second request increased this fraction only slightly to 57 %. All of our e-mails
were delivered correctly this time, but in the end there was still no reaction in
23 % of all cases. In 5 cases (9 %; including 3 of the 13 accounts we were able
to delete on our own), we were able to revive a “deleted” account (deletion
failed). The affected vendors declined to completely delete the accounts even
after we confronted them with our finding (still using the fake profile as a cover).
In 11 % of cases deletion was impossible: in half of these cases we couldn’t find
a way to contact the vendor, in the other cases support staff claimed that it was
impossible to delete the account.
It may be perceived positively that all it takes for consumers to delete their
account is writing an e-mail. Disturbingly, some vendors carried out deletion
instantaneously, failing to check the identity of the sender. This lapse allows
malicious users to delete the accounts of others by sending faked deletion requests
with a forged sender address.
4 Second study: popular websites
4.1 Data collection
The dataset used in the second study contains popular websites that allow their
users to create a user account to store personal data. The dataset was compiled
based on the Alexa Top List for Germany (http://www.alexa.com/). First, we
visited the 100 most popular websites. 57 of those 100 sites allowed us to set
up an account and were therefore added to the dataset. Second, we randomly
sampled 100 sites from the websites with ranks between 100 and 500. We added
63 of those sites to the dataset. Thus, the dataset contains 120 websites that are
popular in Germany and allowed us to set up a user account (cf. Appendix 1).
Some of the selected sites belong to vendors that have already been studied in
the mobile app dataset. For these sites we duplicated the result obtained in the
first study in order to avoid bias due to sending multiple queries to a vendor
within a short period of time. In contrast to the app dataset, shopping sites
make up the largest part (40 %, compared to 7 % of apps), while the fraction
of entertainment sites is quite small (12 %, compared to 46 % of apps). Further,
there are much more large businesses in the website dataset (46 %, compared to
25 % of apps). Figure 6 in the appendix shows the distributions in detail.
4.2 Methodology for interaction with website owners
The methodology used to study the behaviour of website owners resembles the
procedure used for apps (cf. Sect. 3.2), i. e. we created a plausible fake user profile
on each website, using e-mail addresses of the form firstname.lastname@barmail.de.
However, there is one important deviation: This time we also wanted to study
how diligently site owners handled data provision enquiries. After all, the re-
sponses contain sensitive personal data. An impersonator should not be able
to obtain personal data of a different person by fooling a website owner with
a carefully crafted data provision enquiry. Spurious requests should be ignored
and replies should only be sent to the e-mail or postal address stored in the user
account. For this analysis we registered the domain fair-konsult.de, which was
to serve as a cover for a purported impostor. The impostor would send a data
provision enquiry from the “office address” firstname.lastname@fair-konsult.de.
The text of the enquiry did not mention this discrepancy. Instead, it was an
ordinary informal enquiry, i. e. it mentioned the firstname.lastname@barmail.de
address (and username, where appropriate) and stated the desire to obtain the
personal data stored under that account.
If we received no satisfactory response from a site owner, we repeated the
enquiry from the correct address, in analogy to the procedure used for apps. This
time we created a second fake account on each site that was used for the deletion
request. Having seen the results of the first study, we were concerned that our
earlier provision enquiry might be stored in the customer support software of
the site owner and bias the outcome of our deletion request.
After first enquiry using correct address
After second enquiry using correct address
unreachable denied
0.16
Fraction of “OK” responses after enquiry by impostor as well as first and second enquiry from correct address
Inform. 430.19  0.30  0.42
Shopp. 480.19  0.33  0.52
Product. 60.00  0.17  0.17
Main functionality
Comm. 90.00  0.11  0.22
Entert. 140.08  0.08  0.29
large 550.09  0.22  0.33
medium 280.18  0.25  0.50
small 300.20  0.33  0.47
Size of owner’s business
After enquiry by impostor using different e-mail address
Overall evaluation of all websites (120)
no response (0.43) denied (0.30)
incomplete
OK (0.28) incomplete (0.28) 0.07no response (0.31) 0.050.01
account vanished
0.02
OK (0.43) incomplete no response (0.23) 0.080.080.01
OK (0.18) 0.07
reply to correct address
size of sub-sample
Fig. 3. Results for data provision enquiry for popular websites
4.3 Results
The results for the data provision enquiry are summarised in Fig. 3. 30 % of
site owners noticed the incorrect e-mail address and responded with an explicit
denial, while most (43 %) did not bother replying to our bogus enquiry at all.
However, most interestingly, 25 % of website owners were indeed fooled into re-
sponding to our impostor with a satisfactory or incomplete response. One fifth
of those replied to the barmail.de address; the majority would have disclosed
sensitive personal data to an impostor, though. The breakdown of the results
shows that this kind of fault happened at businesses of all sizes. Including the
“OK” cases obtained with the impostor’s enquiry, 28 % of site owners have pro-
vided a complete and correct response to the first enquiry. Eventually, 43 % of
responses were satisfactory. These and most of the remaining figures are in line
with the results obtained for apps (cf. Sect. 3.3). However, large businesses do
not perform better this time. Moreover, some owners said they could not pro-
vide any data, because the account did not exist any more (8 % of accounts had
vanished by the time of the second enquiry). In less than a handful of cases,
site owners required the customer to call them to process the enquiry. As in the
app study, only two site owners responded by postal mail.
Figure 4 presents the results regarding the deletion requests. After the sec-
ond request, 52 % of site owners had completely deleted our account. In contrast
to the app study, some vendors (18 %) claimed that they could not delete the
account for regulatory reasons (e. g. taxation). They promised to block the per-
sonal data. Again, a small fraction of site owners (11 %) claimed that there were
no traces of the account in question (about eight weeks after it had been cre-
ated). Apparently, some site owners purge inactive accounts after a while. This
is in fact beneficial for privacy as it reduces the risk of data leaks for users.
After second deletion request
unreachable
Fraction of “deleted completely” cases after first and second request
Information 430.70  0.70
Shopping 480.38  0.44
Productivity 60.17  0.17
Main functionality
Communication 90.44  0.56
Entertainment 140.29  0.36
large 550.47  0.53
medium 280.57  0.57
small 300.43  0.50
Size of owner’s business
After first deletion request
Overall evaluation of all websites that allowed to create a user account (all 120)
deactivated vanished deletion failed
deleted completely (0.48) 0.09 no reaction (0.26)0.09 0.080.01
deleted completely (0.52) deactivated (0.18) no reaction (0.17)0.11
0.01 0.02
size of sub-sample
Fig. 4. Results for deletion request for popular websites
5 Discussion
A typical ethical issue in undercover field research is that it consumes resources
of the studied subjects without their consent, i. e. in our case the time of the em-
ployees of the surveyed service providers. However, we believe that this approach
is the only way to investigate the problems related to data provision enquiries
and deletion requests in practice. The insights gained may create awareness and
sketch a path of action for regulatory authorities. In the design of our studies,
we tried to minimize the burden on vendors.
While our objective was to survey popular apps and websites, we stress that
the two samples were not meant to be representative. Therefore, the results
cannot be generalized to the whole population of apps and websites. Further,
the results of the first study may be biased due to giving preference to the
Android version of an app in case it happened to be selected for both platforms.
This means that apps that were very popular on both platforms have only been
surveyed on Android, leading to the surveyed iOS apps being slightly less popular
on average. Another potential problem is that it was classified as a failure to
respond to our first enquiry if the response did not come within a week. As some
responses arrived after this time frame had passed, it might be more appropriate
to wait for a longer time in future studies. We are currently in the process of
conducting a more extensive study, based on a more controlled and larger sample
of smartphone apps.
Another potential source of bias stems from the design of the second study
(websites), which includes an additional step to assess the viability of social
engineering attacks. This additional query may have influenced the response of
vendors. First, vendors that need considerably more time than we expected may
have received our authentic mail (sent in the second step) before they were about
to reply to the faked mail. Second, vendors that have refrained from replying
to our faked mail may actually have an increased inclination to respond once
they receive our second mail (because it is the second contact for the same user
account). Thus, these results are biased to some degree. In our follow-up study,
we will therefore leave out the steps to analyse the viability of social engineering.
As noted in Sect. 3.2, it is impossible for us to verify whether a vendor has
completely deleted personal information. This is why we have used techniques
to infer whether any information is left behind. Another approach would have
been to send another data provision enquiry after the deletion request. It would
be interesting to see whether vendors would really admit that they have not
complied with a deletion request. We leave this question for future work.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we quantified the effectiveness of the right of access to personal
data with two studies. We found that for both apps and websites, only 43 %
of our data provision requests were answered satisfactorily by vendors. Many
of those who provided satisfactory information failed to do so after the first
informal enquiry. Accordingly, obtaining one’s personal data often requires per-
severance and precise knowledge of the legal code. This may discourage many
citizens from exercising this right. For deletion requests, the situation is some-
what better: Between 52 % to 57 % of accounts were deleted completely. This
time, a large majority of vendors acted upon the first request, which may be
due to the little effort involved. Worryingly, about 20 % of website owners were
found to be susceptible to social engineering and provided the requested data to
a different e-mail address than the one used to register the account. Although
the right of access has been introduced about two decades ago, exercising it
is both ineffective and inefficient. Instead of error-prone manual processing of
such requests, service providers should (be legally bound to) offer consumers a
standardised interface to access, rectify and erase/block their personal data.
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Appendix 1: Description of datasets
The following apps were selected for the first study:
50 free Android apps: Abs workout, ADAC Maps, Adobe Reader, Angry Birds
Seasons, Angry Birds Star Wars II Free, AutoScout24, Borussia Dortmund, Bub-
ble Island Adventure, Bubble Witch 2 Saga, Candy Crush Saga, Clash of Clans,
Clean Master Phone Boost, DB Navigator, Diamond Dash, Dolphin Browser,
eBay, eBay Kleinanzeigen, Facebook, Facebook Messenger, Fantasy Warlord,
Farm Heroes Saga, Flightradar24 Free, Focus Online, Head Soccer, HVV, ide-
alo, Instagram, Kritika, LINE Gratis-Anrufe, mehr-tanken, Mobile Security &
Antivirus, Opera, Plants vs. Zombies 2, Plumber, Shadow Kings, Shazam, Skype,
Sonic Dash, SPORT1.fm, Spotify, Steam, Subway Surfers, Swamp Attack, Toilet
& Bathroom Rush, TrackID, Traffic Racer, Vector, Viber, wetter.com, Whats-
App
50 free iOS apps: 1-2-3 Tanken, Adobe Photoshop Express, BlaBlaCar, Brain+,
Buddyman:Office Kick, Bundesliga App Fußballfunk, Camu, Color Docks, Cool
Lock Screens, Dont Touch This!, Emoji for iOS 7, Fluege.de, Free Music Mp3
Downloader for SoundCloud, fussball.de, Game of War Fire Age, Gmail, Google
Earth, Google Maps, Hay Day, KICK 15, King of Castles, Kundencenter, Liefer-
held, Lotto24.de, Lufthansa, Make Them Fall, McDonalds, Mein wahres Ich,
Mobile.de, MyVideo TV, Numbrs, Quick Scan QR Code Reader, Retrica, Roller-
Coaster Tycoon 4 Mobile, Runtastic Six Pack, Scuba Dupa, SIMSme, Sportschau,
Star Wars: Commander, Stern Quiz Battle, Swing Copters, Tango, The Rats On-
line, TV Movie, TV Smiles, Web.de Mail, Wetter.de, Wikipedia, Wissenstraining
Allgemeinbildung, Youtube
25 paid Android apps: aCalendar+, Afterlight, Blitzer.de Plus, Construc-
tion Simulator 2014, Farming Simulator 14, Flightradar24 Pro, Gangstar Vegas,
Geometry Dash, GPS Navigation & Maps, Hitman GO, Maps.me, Minecraft
Pocket Edition, Modern Combat 5 Blackout, Monopoly, Plants vs. Zombies,
Poweramp Full Version Unlock, Quizduell Premium, Runtastic PRO, Scribble-
nauts Remix, Survival in Forest, TeamSpeak 3, The Game of Life, Threema,
True Skate, WeatherPro
25 paid iOS apps: 7 Minute Workout, Akinator the Genie, All-in Fitness,
Baby Monitor 3G, Bodyweight, Crazy Chicken Deluxe, Doodle Jump, Facetune,
Fitness Point Pro, Freeletics, Geocaching, GoodReader, Maps 3D, miCal, Mi-
cromon, Plague Inc., Pou, PowerCam, Quit Smoking Pro, R.TYPE, RegenRadar
Pro, Rules!, Star Walk 2, Tiny Wings, Weather Live Reloaded
The following websites were selected for the second study (the default top level
domain “de” is not shown for reasons of conciseness):
57 websites with a rank between 1 and 100: adobe, amazon, apple, arbeits-
agentur, autoscout24, bahn, bild, booking.com, chefkoch, chip, computerbild,
dict.cc, duden, ebay, facebook, faz.net, focus, fotolia, gameforge, gutefrage, han-
delsblatt, heise, immobilienscout24, kicker, linguee, linkedin, live.com, livejas-
min, meinestadt, mobile, mydealz, paypal, pinterest, pornhub.com, redtube.com,
rtl, spiegel, sport1, stackoverflow.com, stern, streamcloud, sueddeutsche, t3n,
transfermarkt, tumblr.com, twitter.com, web, welt, wetter.com, wetter.de, xham-
ster.com, xing, xvideos.com, youporn.com, youtube, zalando, zeit
63 websites with a rank between 100 and 500: ab-in-den-urlaub, alter-
nate, android-hilfe, asos, autobild, autotopdeal, billiger, bonprix, bwin, cam4,
carstart, chattalk, comunio, conrad, cyberghostvpn, cyberport, dawanda, drop-
box, evernote, expedia, expekt, finestautomotive, finya, flyeralarm, friendscout,
fussball, github.com, hamburg, hm, homegate, ikea, immokat, immonet, immo-
welt, joyclub, kalaydo, klamm, klicktel, markt, mitfahrgelegenheit, mitfahrzen-
trale, monster, mybet, mytoys, notebooksbilliger, obi, otto, pcgameshardware,
raumdirekt, saturn, soundcloud, spox, stayfriends, stellenanzeigen, stepstone,
tchibo, thomann, tipico, twitch, urlaubspiraten, vierklee, vimeo, wikia
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Fig. 5. Popular apps dataset overview; figures refer to number of apps out of 150 apps
in total
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Fig. 6. Popular websites dataset overview; figures refer to number of sites out of 120
sites in total
